It favoured greater autonomy to the provinces but it turned
in favour of a strong and assertive centre in the post-independence
period.
The resolution for the establishment of a separate homeland for the
Muslims of British India passed in the annual session of the All India
Muslim League held in Lahore on 22-24 March 1940 is a landmark document
of Pakistan’s history.
The passing of the resolution marked the transformation of the Muslim
minority in British India into a nation with its distinguishing
socio-cultural and political features, a sense of history and shared
aspirations for the future within a territory.
The Lahore Resolution, popularly described as the Pakistan
Resolution, employs modern political discourse for putting forward its
demand rather than using a religious idiom for creating a
religious-Islamic state for protection of Islam from the onslaught of
other religions of India.
It made worldly demand keeping in view the peculiar problems of the
Muslims of British India, the political experience of the Muslim
community and the prevailing debate about the ways to protect Muslim
identity, rights and interests against the backdrop of the modern state
system established by the British in India.
The Resolution addressed the Muslim question in the political and
constitutional context of British India and pointed out to the course of
action the Muslim League intended to adopt to secure the Muslim
identity, rights and interests.
It emphasized the principles that were relevant to modern state
system and the political context of British India. It made five specific
demands:
1. The Resolution rejected the federal system of government as
envisaged in the Government of India Act, 1935 because it was “totally
unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country
and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.”
2. The Muslims would not accept any revised constitutional plan unless it was framed with “their consent and approval.”
3. The adjacent territorial units should be demarcated into regions
that may involve some territorial adjustments in a manner “that the
areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in
north-western and eastern zones of India “become “independent states in
which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”
4. The resolution offered “adequate, effective and mandatory
safeguards for religious minorities” in the Muslim majority units for
the “protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political,
administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with
them.” Similar rights will be given to the Muslims in “other parts of
India.”
5. The Muslim League Working Committee was asked to formulate a
constitutional scheme on the basis of the principles outlined in the
Resolution.
The Resolution thus offered a new course of action for the Muslims of
British India as compared to the Muslim League position adopted on
constitutional and political issues in the past.
The change was that of strategy but not of the goal.
The Muslim League goal since its inception in December 1906 was to
protect and advance Muslim socio-cultural identity, rights and interests
in British India’s socio-political and constitutional context.
Initially the Muslim League demanded separate electorate for the Muslims so that they could elect their representatives.
Later, it sought adequate Muslim representation in the cabinets and state services/jobs.
It also demanded constitutional safeguards and guarantees for the Muslims.
It supported federalism with autonomy for provinces, hoping that the
Muslims would be able to exercise power effectively in the Muslim
majority provinces which would not only boost the Muslim community but
also provide greater opportunity for advancement of Muslim rights and
interests.
The change of strategy was caused by the political experience of the
Muslim elite in their interaction with other communities, especially the
Congress Party, and the policies of the British government.
These strategies also manifested the growing desire of the Muslims to assert their separate socio-political identity.
The Muslim League began to think about discarding the federal model
in 1938, when the Sindh Provincial Muslim League proposed that the All
India Muslim League needed to review its position on constitutional
issues in view of the experience of the Muslims under the Congress
governments in some provinces (1937-39).
What weakened Muslim League’s confidence in the federal model for the
whole of India was the bitter experience of the Muslim educated classes
and urban population under the Congress ministries in the provinces.
The cultural and educational policies of these ministries alienated the Muslims.
The Muslim elite in these and non-Congress provinces came to the
conclusion that the Congress governments in the provinces were imposing
Hindu ethos in the name of Indian identity.
Further the Muslim leaders complained about the discriminatory policy
for recruitment of Muslims to government jobs and they maintained that
the Muslims suffered in the economic domain in the Congress-ruled
provinces.
The experience of the Congress rule in the provinces was the
triggering factor that led the Muslim League leaders to explore a
political alternative to a single Indian federation.
Though the Lahore Resolution talked of a Muslim homeland,
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah did not wholly give up the idea of some
political accommodation within the framework of a loose federal model.
The Muslim League acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan (March
-April 1946) clearly showed that its leaders were willing to work within
a loose federal model that grouped the Muslim majority provinces into
two political groups and non-Muslim majority provinces were put together
as the third group.
These three groups were joined together under a weak federal order.
The provinces in each group could review their relationship with each other and the federal government after ten years.
The Muslim League withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan
when it learnt that the Congress was only interested in getting into
the constituent assembly without giving any specific commitment that the
future constitution would be based on the provisions of the Cabinet
Mission Plan.
The Lahore Resolution did not use the name “Pakistan” in the text and it did not link up the demand with Islam.
The Resolution presented the Muslim demand in the context of British
Indian politics rather than giving a constitutional framework for a
proposed Muslim homeland.
The Muslim League used Islam and made Islam-based appeals for political mobilization for the 1946 provincial elections.
A large number of people and rural-based Islamic clergy, pirs and
sajjadanasheens in the Punjab, Sindh and NWFP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa)
joined the Muslim League after 1940, especially during 1945-47.
Some of the rural clergy helped the Muslim League in its election
campaign. Most of them believed and advocated that Pakistan would have
an Islam based political system.
There is a territorial basis of the Lahore Resolution and its demand for a Muslim homeland.
This demand became credible because of territorial contiguity of
Muslim majority provinces in Northwest and Eastern zone where Bengal and
some of its adjoining areas made it possible to put forward this
demand.
Had the Muslim majority provinces been scattered the homeland demand would not have worked.
The Muslim League leadership was invoking the imperatives of modern
state that included people, territory, government and sovereignty.
The Lahore Resolution has been a basis of three debates in the pre- and post- independence periods.
The first debate relates to the non-use of the name Pakistan in the demand.
The Hindu press and leaders were quick to describe the resolution as
the demand for the creation of Pakistan; some people began to call it
the Pakistan Resolution soon after the Lahore session of the Muslim
League.
The second debate focuses on the use of certain terms in the Resolution.
These include “independent states” and that the constituent units will be “autonomous and sovereign.”
Was the Lahore Resolution talking of one or more than one state for the Muslims of British India?
These ambiguities can be addressed if a literalist approach is not adopted to understand the Lahore Resolution.
Rather, it has to be viewed in the political context of British India
in and around 1940 and the Muslim political experience over time.
In a federal system sovereignty is the prerogative of the federal
government and its constituent units cannot be both “autonomous and
sovereign” at the same time.
In the case of Pakistan, the British government transferred power and
authority to the state of Pakistan through its federal government
established in Karachi.
Pakistani provinces got power from the federal state and the first Interim Constitution.
Pakistan’s federal system was not created by the provinces deciding to set up a federation.
Pakistan’s federation was built into the Indian Independence Act,
passed in July 1947 by the British Parliament and the First Interim
Constitution.
This envisaged a strong centre and weak provinces.
This legacy has haunted Pakistan’s political system from the early years.
The Pakistan movement developed gradually.
It did not stop with the passage of the Lahore Resolution.
Next seven years were important to understand the making of Pakistan.
The Muslim League demands became more specific and assertive in the post-1940 period.
By 1942, the Muslim League focus shifted to a singular phrase of state.
In September 1944 Jinnah was very categorical in asserting that he was taking of one state of Pakistan.
This issue was finally clarified by the convention of Pakistani parliamentarians held in Delhi in April 1946.
The evolutionary process of the movement for the creation of Pakistan
began before March 1940 and ended with the attainment of independence
in Pakistan in 1947.
The third political debate relates to the post-independence period.
Some regional-nationalist leaders in Sindh and Balochistan invoke the
Lahore Resolution for seeking maximum autonomy for provinces.
They demand that Pakistan’s federal model should be based on the
Lahore Resolution. Some leaders have talked of turning Pakistan into a
confederation.
This is a literalist interpretation of the Lahore Resolution which can be described as flawed.
The Lahore Resolution did not offer a framework for organizing the
Pakistani state, especially the distribution of powers between the
federal government and provinces.
It addressed the constitutional issues in an all-India framework and
offered a framework to settle the Hindu-Muslim question on a permanent
basis.
The demand for greater autonomy can be raised by political parties
and leaders in Pakistan with reference to the Muslim League’s political
disposition on federalism in the pre-independence period.
It favoured greater autonomy to the provinces but it turned in favour
of a strong and assertive centre in the post-independence period.
The 18th constitutional amendment marks the beginning of the era of greater administrative and financial autonomy for provinces.
Provinces have more control over their finances and natural resources.
If democracy continues to function and the federal and provincial
governments improve their performance the confidence of people in the
state system will improve.
This will weaken the role of regionalist-nationalist leaders and they
will find it more difficult to invoke the Lahore Resolution for seeking
more provincial autonomy.
The writer is Professor Emeritus, Political Science, Punjab
University, Lahore, and a recipient of the Presidential Award
Sitara-i-Imtiaz.
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